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Happiness is Like This.
Fiction as a Repertoire of Indexical Predicates
Enrico Terrone
RESUMEN
En este artículo se defiende que lo que aprendemos de la ficción consiste en un
repertorio  de  predicados  indéxicos.  En  primer  lugar,  presento  la  noción  de
pensamiento singular y la de predicación indéxica. Argumento en segundo lugar que
las  obras  de  ficción  soportan  un  tipo  peculiar  de  pensamiento  singular  que  deja
espacio para la predicación indéxica En tercer, se muestra que las obras de ficción
pueden  ampliar  significativamente  nuestro  repertorio  de  predicados  indéxicos.
Finalmente,  sostengo  en  cuarto  lugar  que  los  predicados  indéxicos  nos  permiten
abordar con eficacia el problema de la paráfrasis que, según algunos estudiosos, afecta
a la relación entre la ficción y el conocimiento.
PALABRAS CLAVE:  predicados  indéxicos,  pensamiento  singular,  archivos  mentales,
metáfora.
ABSTRACT
This paper argues that what we primarily learn from fiction consists in a reper-
toire of indexical predicates. Firstly, I introduce the notion of singular thought and in-
dexical predication. Secondly, I argue that works of fiction support a peculiar kind of
singular  thought  that  makes  room for  indexical  predication.  Thirdly,  I  show that
works of fiction can significantly widen our repertoire of indexical predicates. Fourth-
ly, I contend that an account of fiction in terms of indexical predicates allows us to ad-
dress the problem of paraphrase, which according to some scholars afflicts the relation
between fiction and knowledge. 
KEYWORDS: Indexical Predicates, Singular Thought, Mental Files, Paraphrase. 
I. INDEXICAL PREDICATION
Indexicals,  as for instance ‘I’  or  ‘this’,  are  expressions whose
contribution to the meaning of a sentence depends upon the context in
which the sentence is uttered. John Perry (1979) criticizes the claim
that indexicals are nothing but convenient (though dispensable) lin-
guistic devices for picking out items for which we accidentally lack
context-independent expressions. He highlights cases in which substi-
tuting an indexical in a sentence changes the thought expressed even if
the item picked out remains the same. Noticing a trail of sugar on a
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supermarket floor and thinking ‘a shopper is making a mess’ is not the
same as  acknowledging that  I  am that  shopper  and thinking ‘I  am
making a mess’. Perry calls this phenomenon “the essential indexical”
[Perry (1979), p. 3] and uses it to show that indexicals play an essen-
tial role in thought. 
In the wake of Perry, Jane Heal shows that indexical thought in-
volves not only referring expressions such as ‘I’ or ‘this’ but also “in-
dexical predicates” [Heal (1997), p. 619] such as ‘like this’, ‘thus’ or
‘in this way’. Such predicates allow us to discover and appreciate the
richness and subtlety of the world, and its variety of aspects and fea-
tures, in a manner that is precluded to thought that only resorts to non-
indexical predicates.1 
Consider the paradigmatic case of color. In order to buy curtains
of a certain shade of red, we can show a sample of this color to the
seller while saying: “The curtains that I want should have a color like
this”. In so doing, we designate a peculiar shade of red by referring to
the sample. 
Nelson Goodman characterizes a sample in general as a symbol
that exemplifies a feature, i.e. a symbol that designates a feature by
virtue of  possessing it  [cf.  Goodman (1968),  pp.  52-56].  John Mc-
Dowell  points  out  that  samples  allow us  to  designate  features  that
could not be conceptualized otherwise, for instance when a speaker
“exploits the presence of the sample” [McDowell (1994),  p.  57] to
designate a certain shade of color. In a similar vein, Heal observes,
“As long as the shade is perceptually present and available for indexi-
cal identification then actions and judgements concerned with match-
ing, harmonious contrast and so forth clearly can occur. They can oc-
cur even if the thinker lacks an accurate and individuating non-indexi-
cal representation of the colour, even if she has no name for it, and
poor ability to recognise and match it in its absence. Her abilities with
the colour when it is present are the result of a constant sensitive inter-
play between her and the object in which the colour is exhibited; there
will  be  a  kind  of  constant  experimenting  with  the  colour,  through
which  its  nature  and  connections  will  reveal  themselves”  [Heal
(1997), p. 637]. 
In general, an indexical predicate designates a feature by pointing
at a particular individual that exhibits that feature. In this sense, an in-
dexical predicate is like a wand that points at an individual (‘this’)
turning it into a predicate (‘like this’). Indexical predication, so under-
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stood,  requires  a  kind  of  thought  that  points  at  single  individuals,
namely singular thought. By pointing at singular individuals, we can
construct not only indexical predicates concerning colors, but also a
variety of other indexical predicates concerning for instance moral and
aesthetic  features,  or  “ways  of  engaging  in  actions”  [Stanley  and
Williamson (2001), p. 427]. 
Still, an indexical predicate can function only if we can point at
the individual exhibiting the property expressed by the predicate. We
can use the predicate ‘like this’ only if ‘this’ picks out an individual in
thought. In fact, there are different sorts of relations that a subject can
exploit in order to pick out individuals in thought, i.e. to refer to them.
More specifically,  one can exploit direct perceptual relations on the
one hand, and mediated relations based on memory, testimony, com-
municative chains on the other hand. What matters for indexical predi-
cation is that the relation at work provides us with an access both to
the individual (‘this’) and to its relevant features supporting the index-
ical predicate (‘like this’). Shared memories, chronicles, historical nar-
ratives, portraits, photographs, audio and video recordings are all de-
vices that allow us to exploit indexical predication (‘like this’) even if
the individual (‘this’) which the predication relies on is not perceptual-
ly present to us in our immediate surroundings. 
That being the case, we can wonder whether we might exploit
also fictional  individuals  in  order  to  construct  indexical  predicates.
Still,  in the case of fiction, there is a significant  complication. The
problem is not just that the individuals supporting indexical predica-
tion are not perceptually present to us in our immediate surroundings.
The main problem is that such individuals are fictional, and therefore
they do not exist. If we want to use fictional individuals as the con-
stituents of indexical predicates, we should find a way to point at indi-
viduals that do not exist. 
II. MENTAL FILES
Recent  philosophical  works  on  singular  thought  [cf.  Jeshion
(2010),  Taylor  (2010),  Recanati  (2012), Crane (2013)] have argued
that we can entertain singular thoughts even about non-existing ob-
jects by virtue of the distinctive functioning of our minds. The idea is
that singular thought requires instantiating a mental device, namely a
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mental file, which allows us to store information about a certain indi-
vidual. Instantiating a mental file elicits the impression of picking out
an individual in thought independently of the existence of this individ-
ual. If this individual really exists, then the singular thought is “refer-
entially  successful”  or  “objective”  [Taylor  (2010),  p.  79].  In  other
words, the mental file picks out a real individual in the actual world.
Yet, even if there is no individual to be picked out in the actual world,
the mental file keeps functioning thereby clustering information about
a fictional individual. 
A mental file of the latter kind is not objective but is “objectual”
or “referentially fit” [Taylor (2010), p.  79]. It has a “form” that fits
with reference, and therefore it can elicit a phenomenology of refer-
ence, though it lacks a proper “content” that ensures the success of the
act of reference [Taylor (2010), p. 80]. In short, a mental file about a
fictional individual does not successfully refer, and yet it purports to
refer and provides us with an experience as of reference. 
Interestingly, in practices of fiction appreciation the information
stored in a mental file concerning a certain fictional individual is not
arbitrarily established by the thinker,  but  depends on a real  object.
This object  is  not,  of  course,  the fictional  individual  itself,  but  the
work of fiction in which this fictional individual has its place (or, if
you want to avoid ontological commitment to works of fiction, a par-
ticular replica of that work of fiction). Thus, mental files about fiction-
al individuals store information that is determined by public objective
sources, rather than arbitrarily established by the subjects of thought. 
In this sense, mental files about fictional individuals, though not
“successful” or “objective”, are however “public or shared files – files
shared by distinct individuals in a community” [Recanati (2012), p.
205]. A public mental file is not just a figment of the imagination.
Rather,  a public mental  file involves  what  Geach calls  “intentional
identity”: “we have intentional identity when a number of people […]
have attitudes with a common focus, whether or not there actually is
something at that focus” [Geach (1967), p.  627]. The common focus
of a public file is such that it commits all the members of a certain
community to storing the same basic information into their files. 
In the case we are interested in, the community is that of the re-
cipients of a certain work of fiction. Each recipient, while enjoying
this work, opens its own files about fictional individuals appearing in
this work, and is committed to store in these files the same core infor-
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mation that is stored by the other recipients. Thus, we can share singu-
lar thoughts about fictional individuals, in spite of the fact that such
individuals do not exist. We can all purport to refer to the same fic-
tional individuals, and we can exploit such a public purported refer-
ence to carry out indexical predication. 
More specifically,  we can construct and use the predicate ‘like
this’ in our communication practices even if ‘this’ is a fictional indi-
vidual. We can do so inasmuch as we are all recipients of the same
work of fiction, and therefore, in enjoying that work, we all share our
mental files about the fictional individuals that appear in it.2
In sum, we can distinguish two kinds of reference: successful ref-
erence, or ‘s-reference’, on the one hand, and publicly shared purport-
ed reference, or ‘p-reference’, on the other hand. My point is that p-
reference  is  sufficient  for  indexical  predication.  If  we  all  deploy a
mental file that purports to refer to the same individual, we can use
this public file to construct an indexical predicate even if the individu-
al to whom we purportedly refer does not exist. 
Even in the basic cases of indexical predication through s-refer-
ence, it is the mental file, not the object referred to, that matters for the
‘like this’ predication. We could exploit the act of pointing at a red
sample in order to designate a certain shade of red even in a “matrix
scenario” in which the subjects of experience have a cognitive system
that receives its inputs from and sends its outputs to an artificially-de-
signed computer simulation of a world [see Chalmers (2005), p. 132].
On the one hand, in such a scenario, the act of pointing at a sample
does not pick up a real sample and thus reveals itself to be nothing but
a shared  purported reference to a non-existing sample. On the other
hand, in this very scenario, the subjects undergoing the simulation can
still share the indexical predicate ‘like this’ since they share the same
purported reference. 
Likewise, we can exploit the act of pointing at a fictional individ-
ual in order to construct and share a certain indexical predicate. What
ultimately grounds indexical predication is a shared mental  file,  re-
gardless of the existence of the individuals to whom it aims at refer-
ring. 
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III. THE SHADES OF A CONCEPT
I argue that a crucial aspect of learning from fiction consists in
learning new indexical predicates. In this sense, learning from fiction
resembles more learning from a dictionary than learning from an en-
cyclopedia. What we learn from dictionaries are not warranted beliefs
but rather new terms that will possibly allow us to understand or to ex-
press new warranted beliefs. Likewise, what we learn from fiction is,
in the first instance, a repertoire of indexical predicates, which will
possibly allow us to characterize more effectively the world and our
experience of the world.3
In fact, we can learn indexical predicates both by having ordinary
experiences and by enjoying works of fiction. Yet indexical predicates
based  on  fictional  individuals  (henceforth:  ‛f-predicates’)  have,  in
principle, three advantages with respect to indexical predicates based
on real individuals (henceforth: ‛r-predicates’). First, f-predicates are
more stable than r-predicates, since the features of fictional individu-
als are fixed, once and for all, by the works of fiction whereas real in-
dividuals undergo continuous changes, and their past states often are
no longer accessible to us. Second, f-predicates cover a wider domain
than r-predicates since they are not limited to what we can currently
observe in the physical world; f-predicates allow us to characterize not
only actual situations, but also possible scenarios. Third, f-predicates,
unlike r-predicates, allow us to point at individuals and their features
without any interaction with these individuals.  This avoids interfer-
ence that might alter the feature we aim at highlighting through index-
ical predication. For instance, pointing at a lonely real person in order
to highlight its loneliness might alter this very loneliness, whereas this
cannot happen if we point at a lonely fictional character. Fiction in-
volves an absolute spatiotemporal  detachment  of the recipient from
the fictional characters that can improve indexical predication. Karen
Hanson points out the cognitive advantages of such a detachment in
the case of film: “we view the subjects of film but are not viewed by
them, and thus we are empowered in judgment. Persons with whom
we live will openly contest our interpretations of them, but we have no
social interaction with the persons we see on the screen. […] The per-
spective we have in viewing them is, as it were, the only perspective on
them and on the events in which they are implicated. It is no wonder we
feel assured in our judgments about them” [Hanson (1987), p. 395].
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Fiction, so understood, becomes a laboratory of thought in which
we can experiment with new indexical predicates. We can do so by
purporting to refer to a fictional individual (a ‘this’) thereby consider-
ing the feature expressed by a predicate having the form ‘like this’. It is
worth noting that a fictional individual can be not only a person, but
also an object, an event, a process, or even a “situation” understood as
“some part of reality” [Recanati (1996), p. 459]. Indeed, by ‘individual’
I mean – following Peter Strawson – something that has its particular
place in an (either actual or fictional) “unitary spatio-temporal frame-
work,  of  one  temporal  and  three  spatial  dimensions”  [Strawson
(1959), p. 38]. 
To sum up, what we primarily learn from fiction are not warranted
beliefs but rather new predicates that we can use in our attempts to ac-
quire warranted beliefs. Indeed, many predicates that we use in lan-
guage are too coarse-grained for grasping the relevant features of cer-
tain phenomena. Consider for example terms such as ‘love’, ‘friend-
ship’, ‘happiness’, ‘virtue’, ‘justice’, ‘beauty’, ‘elegance’, ‘funniness’,
‘fear’,  ‘joy’,  ‘misery’.  More generally,  the  linguistic  terms  that  we
usually employ to speak of domains such as ethics, aesthetics, or psy-
chology are expressively limited, just as the linguistic terms we usual-
ly employ to speak of colors. As the mere word ‘red’ cannot grasp the
peculiarity of a certain shade of red, so the mere word ‘happiness’
cannot grasp the peculiarity of a certain shade of happiness. 
In the case of colors, we can address this issue by showing a cer-
tain sample while saying: “the shade of red I mean is like this”. Like-
wise, in the case of happiness, we can point at a certain fictional indi-
vidual while saying: “the shade of happiness I mean is like this”. For
instance, in his book Pursuits of Happiness, Stanley Cavell explores a
peculiar  shade  of  happiness,  which  he  calls  “remarriage”  [Cavell
(1959), p. 1], and he does so by pointing at certain fictional individu-
als and situations in Hollywood comedies while implicitly making this
sort of claim: ‘the shade of happiness I mean is like this’. 
Noël Carroll  explicitly exploits the analogy between shades of
colors and shades of moral concepts. He does so when he argues that
some works of fiction provide us with “a wheel of virtue” which al-
lows us to explore a variety of shades or nuances of a certain virtue or
vice, as well as the wheel of color allows us to explore the variety of
shades or nuances of a certain color. For example, Dickens’ Great Ex-
pectations allows us to explore certain shades of “the virtues of par-
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enthood” and Forster’s Howard Ends does the same for “the virtues of
the imagination and of practicality” [Carroll (1973), p. 12]. 
My point  is  that  such an exploration of  shades  or  nuances  of
moral concepts is carried out by means of indexical predication. We
can explore a certain shade or nuance of a given concept by pointing
at a certain fictional individual thereby constructing the predicate ‘like
this’. As we can explore some chromatic shades by pointing at areas
in the wheel of color,  so we can explore some shades of a certain
moral  concept  by  pointing  at  certain  characters  in  the  “wheel  of
virtue” which is  supplied  by some works of fiction. As long as the
shades of a concept are available for indexical identification through the
purported reference to fictional individuals, there will be a constant ex-
perimenting with the concept, through which its nature and connec-
tions will reveal themselves. 
It  is  worth noting that  we can construct  and use an indexical
predicate only if we already possess the concept whose shades or nu-
ances we aim to explore. Such a concept is needed in order to specify
the relevant likeness that constitutes the indexical predicate expressed
by the ‘like this’ formula. In fact, this requirement holds also in the
paradigmatic case of colors. A piece of cloth can function as a sample
of a certain shade of color only if, while pointing at this thing, we ac-
knowledge that color – instead of, say, length – is the relevant feature
on which to focus in looking at it. Likewise, a fictional individual al-
lows us to construct an indexical predicate only if we acknowledge the
relevant concept (for instance, happiness) on which to focus in order
to grasp the likeness conveyed by the formula ‘like this fictional indi-
vidual’.4 
In sum, works of fiction widen our capacity to describe and char-
acterize the world by supplementing our dictionary with a variety of
indexical predicates that significantly refine our ordinary terms and
concepts. Still, we can effectively employ such predicates only if the
fictional individuals that underlie them are part of a common ground
in our community. A discourse containing the indexical predicate ‘like
this fictional individual’ can be properly understood only if the hearers
can deploy a mental file concerning this individual. Fictional individu-
als should be shared in order to function as constituents of indexical
predicates. In fact, some of the most famous fictional characters in our
culture are often used as constituents of indexical predicates. Ulysses
allows us to express a certain shade of intelligence, Othello a certain
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shade of jealousy,  Don Quixote a certain shade of naivety,  Raskol-
nikov a  certain shade of  nihilism.  That  is  because,  in  enjoying  the
works of fiction created by Homer, Shakespeare, Cervantes, or Dosto-
evsky,  we have implicitly learned indexical predicates such as ‘like
Ulysses’, ‘like Don Quixote’, ‘like Othello’, ‘like Raskolnikov’, and
from then on we can use such predicates to effectively describe and
characterize some relevant features of our actual world. 
It is worth noting that proper names of fictional characters play
the same role as indexicals inasmuch as they function as linguistic de-
vices for singling out individuals in thought. Ever since a work of fic-
tion implicitly or explicitly declares that the name of this individual is
Othello, ‘Othello’ can be used as a linguistic device that purports to
refer to that individual just as the indexical ‘this’ would have done. To
borrow Putnam’s expression, a proper name such as Othello possesses
“an unnoticed indexical component” [Putnam (1973), p. 710]. In other
words, we can conceive of the name ‘Othello’ as a label that is at-
tached to a public mental file thereby allowing us to effectively recall
this file. Thus, a predicate such as ‘like Othello’ functions as an index-
ical predicate inasmuch as it can be paraphrased in the following way:
‘like this individual to whom the public mental file labeled ‘Othello’
purports to refer’. 
IV. THE DILEMMA OF PARAPHRASE
Recipients of works of fiction carry out tasks of identification
and recognition of individuals that  emulate  the corresponding tasks
which our ordinary experience relies on. For example, the task carried
out by the spectator of a movie emulates her ordinary task of perceptu-
al identification and recognition of individuals,  and the task carried
out by the reader of a novel emulates her ordinary task of identifica-
tion and recognition of individuals referred to in oral or written com-
munication. Recipients of works of fiction can effectively carry out
such tasks because fiction files have a phenomenology of reference
that is similar to that of regular files. Fiction provides us with frame-
works in which to play the same sort of games of identification and
recognition that we are used to play in our everyday experience. Thus,
fiction offers us a repertoire of indexical predicates, which we can ex-
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ploit by purporting to refer to a fictional individual (‘this’) and using it
to express a predicate (‘like this’). 
My point is that what we learn from fiction consists, in the first
instance, in the capacity to understand and use such predicates. Then,
works of fiction might also exploit such predicates to provide us with
additional knowledge.5 Indeed, some works of fiction seem to aim at
providing  us  with  knowledge  by  making  claims  about  the  actual
world, more or less explicitly. Yet, also in these cases, indexical predi-
cation plays  a  key role,  since such claims  normally have indexical
predicates among their basic constituents. More specifically, the main
sort of claim that can be made by a work of fiction has the following
structure: “in the  actual world, something is like this”, where ‘this’
purports to refer to some fictional individual or situation. 
Highlighting  the  role  of  indexical  predication  as  a  bridge  be-
tween fiction and knowledge provides us with a way of addressing a
problem  that  seems  to  afflict  the  connection  between  fiction  and
knowledge, namely the problem that Cleanth Brooks calls the “heresy
of paraphrase” [Brooks (1968), p. 172; see also Smith (2006), p. 40].
This  expression  emphasizes  the  impossibility  to  make  explicit  and
share with other people what we allegedly learn from fiction: “When
we consider the statement immersed in the poem, it presents itself to
us, like the stick immersed in the pool of water, warped and bent. In-
deed, whatever the statement, it will always show itself as deflected
away from a positive, straightforward formulation” [Brooks (1968), p.
172]. The statement made by a work of fiction cannot be made explic-
it and communicated; in this sense, it resembles a stick that cannot be
extracted from the pool of water in which it is immersed. 
Given the heresy of paraphrase, if we assume that a work of fic-
tion can provide us with some knowledge about the actual world, then
we seem forced to face the two horns of a dilemma. The heresy of
paraphrase leads us to the “an insoluble dilemma of paraphrase” [Liv-
ingston (2006), p. 15]. This dilemma can be stated as follows. On the
first horn, the knowledge supplied by a work of fiction can be para-
phrased by some claims about the actual world, and therefore attend-
ing to the work of fiction is just a thorny way to acquire knowledge
that  can be more  effectively acquired by simply focusing on these
claims. On the second horn, if a work of fiction provides us with some
insights about the actual world that cannot be paraphrased, then it is
questionable  whether  such  insights  can  aspire  to  the  condition  of
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knowledge, given that we seem to lack a way of assessing them by
sharing them with other subjects. Going back to Brooks’ metaphor, ei-
ther we try to extract the stick from the pool with poor results (first
horn of the dilemma) or we leave the stick in the pool thereby giving
up benefiting from it (second horn of the dilemma).6 
I  argue that  an account  of  fiction  as  a  repertoire  of  indexical
predicates may provide us with a way out of the dilemma of para-
phrase. We can accept that the insights supplied by the work of fiction
should be paraphrased in order to aspire to the condition of knowl-
edge, and yet this paraphrase should include indexical predicates that
refer to a fictional individual or situation. Therefore, even if we resort
to a paraphrase, the fiction is not dispensable, since this very para-
phrase resorts to indexical predicates that are rooted in the fiction. Fi-
nally, we are not forced to choose one of the two horns of the dilemma
of paraphrase, which reveals itself to be a false dilemma. Even if we
refuse to choose the first horn, which would force us to give up the pe-
culiarity of fiction, we are not forced to choose the second horn, which
would force us to give up the possibility of a paraphrase. Indexical
predication allows us to let Brooks’ stick immersed in the pool of wa-
ter and nevertheless benefit from it. 
The point is that, in order to paraphrase the peculiar knowledge
that we can acquire from fiction, we should resort to indexical predi-
cates that depend on fiction, and therefore the paraphrase itself essen-
tially depends on fiction. Consider, for instance, Robert Bresson’s film
Au hazard Balthazar. One might try to paraphrase the claim implicitly
made by the film. Surely, this paraphrase requires an interpretation of
the work,  but  this  happens also in  the  case  of  many philosophical
works that we nevertheless treat as proper candidates to the condition
of knowledge. Thus, the need for an interpretation does not seem to
rule out the possibility that a work of fiction may count as a source of
knowledge. 
Thus, let us consider the following paraphrase of the claim sup-
posedly made by Au hazard Balthazar: ‘life is nothing but to be born,
to have a sensitive body, to experience pleasurable or painful feelings,
to pass through a series of random events and encounters, and finally
to die’. This paraphrase falls prey to the first horn of the dilemma,
since there is no need to watch a film lasting one hour and a half in or-
der to grasp a view of life that we can equally grasp by reading a few
line sentence. Yet, I argue, the proper paraphrase for this film is not
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the one above, but rather the following: ‘life is nothing but to be born
like Balthazar is, to have a sensitive body like Balthazar has, to expe-
rience  pleasurable  and  painful  feelings  like  Balthazar  does,  to  go
through a series of random events and encounters like Balthazar does,
and finally to die like Balthazar does’. The cognitive relevance of Au
hazard Balthazar is not to be found in a general sentence on what life
is. Instead, this relevance consists in pointing at a fictional living be-
ing, a donkey called ‛Balthazar’, thereby highlighting what the com-
ponents of a life are and therefore what life as a whole is. Removing
the ‘like Balthazar’ clauses from the paraphrase amounts to depriving
the film’s claim about life of its perspicacity and subtlety. 
In sum, we should not content ourselves with individuating the
claim of a work of fiction such as Au hazard Balthazar by means of a
sentence that avoids indexical expressions, namely a sentence such as
‘life  is  nothing  but  a  series  of  accidental  meaningless  events’.  We
should rather focus on a sentence such as: ‘life is like this, life is Balt-
hazaresque’. Understanding the latter sentence, unlike understanding
the former, requires being (or at least having been) in touch with the
work of fiction. This is analogous to understanding the sentence ‘my
favorite shade of red is like this’, which requires being in touch with
the sample to which the speaker refers.
The paraphrase ‘life is like this, life is Balthazaresque’, in virtue
of its containing an indexical predicate, may be further explained and
clarified  by  drawing attention  to  particular  features or  parts  of  the
work of fiction, and their relations to each other in that work. Here we
come to the more sophisticated paraphrase  ‘life is nothing but to be
born like Balthazar is, to have a sensitive body like Balthazar has, to
experience pleasurable and painful feelings like Balthazar does, to go
through a series of random events and encounters like Balthazar does,
and finally to die like Balthazar does’. In this paraphrase, the indexical
predicate ‘Balthazaresque’ is clarified by drawing attention to particu-
lar features of Balthazar’s fictional life in order to clarify the notion of
life in general. For instance, the expression ‘to be born like Balthazar
is’ does not simply mean the platitude that life begins with birth. In-
stead, this expression points at a peculiar way of being born, a Balthaz-
aresque birth surrounded by a festive flock in an atmosphere of hope
and endearment, thereby highlighting the peculiar contribution of birth
to the shape of a whole life. 
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This suggests a way of approaching works of fiction in search of
their cognitive value. The idea is to give up the arduous task of para-
phrasing the work’s claim by translating it into a sentence that makes
no reference to the work itself. As Brooks would put it, we cannot ex-
tract the stick out of the pool of water in which it is immersed. Yet,
this  does  not  mean  giving  up  the  task  of  paraphrasing  the  work’s
claim. Indexical predication provides us with a different mean to the
same end. We can still try to paraphrase the claim of a work of fiction
by  drawing attention to particular features or parts of it, in order to
discover, explore, and clarify the indexical predicates that constitute
its claim. 
Ultimately, fiction is not just a funny and thorny way of acquir-
ing knowledge that we might learn in more serious and effective ways.
Inasmuch as the sharing of such knowledge requires a paraphrase that
in turn requires indexical predicates grounded in fiction, the experi-
ence of  fiction reveals  itself  as  an indispensable  component  of  the
knowledge acquired. Fiction is something more than a ladder that we
can throw away after climbing up on it.7 
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NOTES 
1 A foreshadowing of the notion of indexical predication can be found
in this passage of Wittgenstein’s Brown Book: “‛Words can’t exactly describe
it’, one sometimes says. And yet one feels that what one calls the expression
of the face is something that can be detached from the drawing of the face. It
is as though we could say:  ‛This face has a particular  expression: namely
this’ (pointing to something). But if I had to point to anything in this place it
would have to be the drawing I am looking at” [Wittgenstein (1958), p. 162]. 
2 I owe to an anonymous referee the observation that mental files con-
cerning other nonexistent yet nonfictional individuals, namely mythical indi-
viduals (for example Vulcan), are also shared. Thus, in principle, also mythi-
cal individuals such as Vulcan might support indexical predication. Yet, in
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fact,  fictional  characters  are usually more apt  than mythical  individuals to
support  indexical  predication since the former are  usually much more de-
tailed and rich of features than the latter.
3 John Gibson (2008) and Jukka Mikkonen (2015) call “neo-cognitivist”
the approaches that treat the cognitive value of fiction in terms of “under-
standing” rather than in terms of warranted beliefs. Mikkonen mentions the
works of Catherine Z. Elgin (1993) and Eileen John (1998) as forerunners of
neo-cognitivist approaches. The approach I am proposing can be understood
as a neo-cognitivist approach that exploits the notion of indexical predication
in order to clarify the “understating” provided by works of fiction. 
4 I owe to an anonymous referee the observation that indexical predica-
tion is affected by the same sort of “qua problem” that affects singular refer-
ence. Devitt (1981) calls “qua problem” the fact that to fix the reference of a
term by an act of demonstration requires knowing what kind of object we are
pointing at. As suggested by the anonymous referee, an anticipation of De-
vitt’s point can be found in this passage from Bolzano: “pointing and saying
or thinking ‘this’ does not suffice to fix the reference. I remedy this indetermi-
nacy if I determine through a general noun the species of thing to which the in-
tended object belongs, i.e. if I indicate that particular species, of which there are
not several at the indicated location and time. Thus, instead of ‘this thing’ I say
‘this leaf,’ ‘this colour,’ etc. […] This method can be used to designate pure in-
tuitions.” [Bolzano (1837), § 75].
5 I owe the insight that fiction can provide us with knowledge involving
indexicals to two talks which I have had the chance to attend. The first was
‛The Cognitive Value of Literature’, given by Gregory Currie and Anna Ichi-
no at the University of Sheffield on July 18th 2013. The second was ‛Littéra-
ture  et  connaissance  pratique’,  given  by  Pascal  Engel  at  the  Collège  de
France on March 25th 2015. Currie and Ichino pointed out that fiction can
provide us with statements such as “love is irrational in this way” (pointing to
Proust’s In Search of Lost Time) or “war is more probable in this way” (point-
ing to Kubrick’s Dr Strangelove). Likewise, Engel highlighted that fiction can
provide us with statements such as “Here is a way of being slothful” (pointing
to Goncharov’s  Oblomov) or “Here is  a way of being stupid” (pointing to
Flaubert’s Bouvard et Pécuchet).
6 The second horn of the dilemma exposes the alleged cognitive value
of fiction to the allegations of ineffability that have been made, for instance,
by Hilary Putnam (1978) and by Peter Lamarque (1997). 
7 Thanks to Filippo Contesi and the two anonymous referees for their
helpful comments on an earlier versions of this paper. 
REFERENCES 
16
BOLZANO,  B. (1837),  Wissenschaftslehre;  English  translation:  Theory  of
Science,  by  Rolf  George  and  Paul  Rusnock,  New  York,  Oxford
University Press, 2014.
BROOKS,  C. (1968),  The  Well  Wrought  Urn:  Studies  in  the  Structure  of
Poetry, London, Methuen.
CARROLL,  N.  (2002),  ‘The  Wheel  of  Virtue:  Art,  Literature,  and  Moral
Knowledge’, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 60, 1, pp. 3-
26.
CAVELL,  S. (1981),  Pursuits  of  Happiness:  The  Hollywood  Comedy  of
Remarriage, Cambridge, Harvard University Press. 
CHALMERS,  D.  J. (2005),  ‘The  Matrix  as  Metaphysics’,  in  C.  Grau  (ed.),
Philosophers Explore the Matrix, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp.
132-76.
CRANE, T. (2013), The Objects of Thought, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
DEVITT, M. (1981), Designation, New York, Columbia University Press. 
ELGIN, C. Z. (1993), ‘Understanding: Art and Science’, Synthese, 95, pp. 13-
68.
GEACH, P. T. (1967), ‛Intentional Identity’,  Journal of Philosophy, 64, 20, pp.
627-632.
GIBSON, J. (2008), ‘Cognitivism and the Arts’,  Philosophy Compass, 3, pp.
573-589.
GOODMAN,  N. (1968),  Languages  of  Art:  An  Approach  to  a  Theory  of
Symbols, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill. 
HANSON, K. (1987), ‘Minerva in the Movies: Relations Between Philosophy
and Film’, Persistence of Vision, 5, pp. 5-11; reprinted in Carroll N. and
Choi J. (eds.), Philosophy of Film and Motion Pictures: An Anthology,
New York, Wiley-Blackwell, 2005, pp- 391-396. 
HEAL, J. (1997), ‛Indexical Predicates and their Uses’, Mind, Vol. 106, 424,
pp. 619-640.
JESHION, R. (2010), ‛Singular Thought: Acquaintance, Semantic Instrumental-
ism,  and  Cognitivism’,  in  Jeshion,  R.  (ed.)  New Essays  on  Singular
Thought, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 105-140. 
JOHN, E. (1998), ‘Reading Fiction and Conceptual Knowledge: Philosophical
Thought  in  Literary  Context’,  The  Journal  of  Aesthetics  and  Art
Criticism 56, pp. 331-348.
LAMARQUE, P. (1997), ‘Learning from Literature’,  The Dalhousie Review 77,
pp. 7-21.
LIVINGSTON, P. (2006), ‛Theses on Cinema as Philosophy’, The Journal of Aes-
thetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 64, 1, pp. 11-18.
MCDOWELL, J.  (1994),  Mind  and  World,  Cambridge,  Harvard  University
Press.
17
MIKKONEN, J. (2015), ‘On Studying the Cognitive Value of Literature’,  The
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 73, 3, pp. 273-282.
PERRY, J. (1979) ‛The Problem of the Essential Indexical’,  Noûs, Vol. XIII,
pp. 3-21.
PUTNAM,  H. (1973), ‘Meaning and Reference’,  The Journal of Philosophy,
70, 19, pp. 699-711
–– (1978), ‘Literature, Science, and Reflection’, in  Meaning and the Moral
Sciences, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 83-94.
RECANATI,  F. (1996), ‛Domains of Discourse’,  Linguistics and Philosophy,
Vol. 19, 5, pp. 445-475. 
–– (2012), Mental Files, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
SMITH,  M. (2006),  ‛Film Art,  Argument,  and Ambiguity’,  The Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 64, 1, pp. 33-42.
STANLEY, J. and WILLIAMSON, T. (2001), ‛Knowing How’, The Journal of Phi-
losophy, Vol. 98, 8, pp. 411-444.
STRAWSON, P. (1959), Individuals, London, Methuen. 
TAYLOR, K. (2010), ‛On Singularity’, in Jeshion, R. (ed.) New Essays on Sin-
gular Thought, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 77-102. 
WITTGENSTEIN, L. (1958), The Blue and Brown Books, Oxford, Blackwell.
